China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit to the Philippines from 21–23 April 2023 comes at a critical time when the relationship between Manila and Beijing continues to face several notable challenges. China is concerned about the strengthening alliance between the Philippines and the United States (US) and the implications of the latter’s increasing military presence in the Southeast Asian region for the security of Taiwan. The Chinese foreign minister’s trip to the Southeast Asian country just over a week after the start of the annual BALIKATAN exercise between the Philippine and American militaries also indicates Beijing’s desire to manage and potentially diffuse bilateral tensions with Manila. However, unless China will be willing to let go of its egoistic and assertive regional ambitions, it is unlikely that such a visit will result in a significant and long-lasting improvement in its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbour.
It must be highlighted that when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. began to forge his foreign policy vision for the Philippines, he gave China the benefit of the doubt by emphasising Manila’s desire to manage relations with its largest immediate neighbour through proactive and constructive dialogue. Therefore, by highlighting its intent to improve relations with China, the Marcos administration effectively placed the ball in Beijing’s court. However, the problem is that the incumbent Chinese regime seeks to solidify its national political power by fuelling nationalist sentiments through assertive foreign policy approaches. This limits any room for peaceful or practical diplomacy from Beijing due to fears of seeming weak at home. This political reality under the leadership of President Xi Jinping continues to show how China remains notoriously inconsistent when it comes to its political statements and what it practically does on the ground.
The provocative statements by the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines regarding the safety of the nearly 200,000 Filipino overseas workers in Taiwan in times of conflict serve as another point towards this unfortunate pattern.
Just weeks after the noteworthy pledges made by Marcos and Xi in January to manage tensions in the South China Sea, China reverted to its assertive manoeuvres against Philippine sovereignty and sovereignty within the Southeast Asian country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). More recently, the provocative statements by the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines regarding the safety of the nearly 200,000 Filipino overseas workers in Taiwan in times of conflict serve as another point towards this unfortunate pattern. Therefore, taking the rational course of action, Manila sought to leverage its alliance with the US to enhance its abilities to safeguard its territorial integrity more effectively amid the increasing threats posed by a rising and assertive China.
However, it must be noted that for the Philippines, the alliance with the US is a means to an end and not an end in itself. What this means is that given the fluctuations and shifts taking place in the regional geopolitical landscape, the role of the US as a traditional security provider comes second to none. Hence, it is inevitable for Manila to seek to harness and maximise the potential of the alliance to achieve an end or more efficiently bolster the Philippines’ territorial defence capabilities, military modernisation programme, and defence network dynamics. This also means that while Manila and Washington will continue to deepen their cooperation in areas of mutual interest and concern, the former will not seek to be engulfed by alliance or bloc politics as a primary catalyst for its external relations.
This was evident when the Philippine National Security Council stated that Manila does not seek to interfere or meddle in Taiwan’s affairs. Manila is well aware that by virtue of geography, socioeconomics, and the responsibilities under the treaty alliance, the security situation in Taiwan is greatly linked to the Philippines’. However, this does not mean that Manila will seek to play an active role in adding more fuel to the fire by provoking the already volatile US-China power competition. The Philippines’ primary security interests lie in the protection of its sovereignty and sovereign rights more than anything else. It is in this light that Beijing must better comprehend its relations with the Philippines.
Manila is well aware that by virtue of geography, socioeconomics, and the responsibilities under the treaty alliance, the security situation in Taiwan is greatly linked to the Philippines’.
Manila’s foreign policy remains autonomous in a sense that despite the intensifying US-China power competition in the Western Pacific, the Philippines still seeks to engage proactively with Beijing through diplomatic and peaceful to more effectively manage ties and mitigate any potential tensions, particularly in the maritime domain. Manila has emphasised this time and again.
The problem, therefore, which China seeks to highlight, is its own doing. Beijing cannot continue using the strengthening Philippines-US alliance as an excuse to justify its assertive and provocative actions within the Philippine EEZ. It is not only illogical but also shows its inability to understand the messages and signals Manila has been clearly conveying since the beginning of this administration. The ball remains in China’s court. If Beijing seeks to create a more conducive regional environment, particularly in the context of its relations with the Philippines, it must be willing to set aside its egoistic ambitions and demonstrate its commitment to act as a better neighbour. There is no doubt that Manila wants to have good and productive relations with Beijing, but it will not allow itself to be subjugated to China’s narrowly defined objectives in the region, which continue to come at the expense of the Philippines’ sovereignty and sovereign rights.
Source : ORF